by Stephen Lesslie
Few intellectual tyrannies can be more recalcitrant than the truths that everybody knows and nearly no one can defend with any decent data (for who needs proof of anything so obvious). — Stephen J. Gould
In the April edition we examined the “truth” that STV electorates must contain an odd number of members.
In this edition we examine the “truth” that in a STV election voters must indicate preferences for more than one candidate.
In STV elections in Australia, this number varies from all candidates to at least half of the candidates to be elected. Only in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is a vote valid if only one preference is marked.
Even the PRSA, as can be seen in the following extract from the PRSA’s website, is unable to support the use of fully optional marking of preferences. Note the unintended irony in the heading!
Inadvisability of Imposing Constraints in Proportional Representation Elections
Preferable Means of Encouraging Diversity: A far fairer way of encouraging diversity in a representative body is to couple the maximum use of a quota-preferential system of proportional representation with the minimum use of devices like those, which the history of Australian Senate ballot-paper designs demonstrates, attempt to arbitrarily or subtly distort voters’ preferences. This includes Group Voting Tickets, and unnecessary formality provisions for the full marking of all preferences rather than a requirement that a minimum number of preferences equal to the number of positions to be filled is required. (our emphasis)
Why have this regimentation forcing voters to vote for more candidates than they may want to?
Where are the democratic rights of Australian voters in all of this? What gives anyone the right to say, “even though you have given a clear and unequivocal indication of the candidate or candidates of your choice we will not count your ballot paper?”
This appears to be an Australian disease. Fully optional preferential voting is allowed in Ireland and Malta, the only two countries which elect their national governments by STV, and the author has been unable to find any instances outside Australia where the compulsory marking of preferences is a requirement.
The reason for the insistence on compulsory marking of preferences seems to be to ensure that votes do not exhaust (full marking of preferences) or to reduce the number of exhausted votes (partial marking of preferences) during the count. However, no consideration is given to the consequent increase in the number of informal votes caused by the increase in the complexity of the ballot. Have any studies been undertaken to determine whether the forced marking of preferences actually does reduce the incidence of exhausted votes?
Fortunately, the ACT does allow for fully optional preferential voting and this gives us an opportunity to examine the recent ACT election to observe the effect of exhausted ballot papers on the outcome. Although the ballot paper for the Molonglo electorate states, “Number seven boxes from 1 to 7 in the order of your choice”, and for Ginninderra and Brindabella, “Number five boxes from 1 to 5 in the order of your choice”, any vote with at least one preference is considered formal.